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Market Dynamics Around Public Information Arrivals
Abstract
I analyze the impact of the arrival of public information on the intraday trading of highly liquid
stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse. Using the Reuters alert system, I gather a large sample of
firm-specific news and analyze market behavior around news releases. I estimate the transaction
cost components around public information releases. I find that there is a disclosure impact on
both trading and order flow. I also find that trading around news releases is characterized by
relatively small adverse selection and order processing costs, and high order persistence.
Keywords: Firm-Specific News; Public Information Arrivals; Market Microstructure;
Transaction Cost; Price Formation Model; High Frequency Data; Paris Bourse
JEL Classification: C35; G13; G14; G152
Executive Summary
The investigation of news impacts on asset markets has drawn much attention in the
financial literature. The link between information and impacts in trading activity has been
analyzed from many standpoints. The study of effects of information disclosures is a central
topic in accounting, market efficiency, and microstructure literature.
The main contribution of my research is to analyze the intraday market dynamics around
arrivals of firm-specific news. My paper has two parts. In the first part, I provide a descriptive
analysis of the market dynamics before and after releases of firm-specific Reuters news. Using
the Reuters alerts system, I collect six months of firm-specific news for a sample of 30 highly
liquid French stocks. Analyzing the trading activity around the exact disclosure times allows me
to recognize the patterns of the market reaction. In the second part of the paper, I gauge the
transaction cost around the arrival of public information. According to the microstrucutre
literature, I decompose the transaction cost in its main components, i.e. adverse selection cost,
order processing cost, and order persistence. I compare three cost components models. These
models are the Glosten and Harris model (1988), the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans
model (1997), and I propose an autoregressive model based on the ordered probit estimation
that I call the AR model. The AR model provides an estimation of the transaction cost
components that respects price discreteness and yet is sensitive to the protracted effects of the
trade process. The comparative analysis between the AR model and the two other models of
transaction cost components delivers insight into transaction cost measurement and price
dynamics.
My paper contributes to the previous literature in many aspects. Market efficiency
requires that security prices fully reflect all availabe information implying that new
information is incorporated in security prices sufficiently fast. Addressing firm-specific news,
my study differs significantly from the body of the financial literature that examines the effects
of macroeconomic news, e.g. the consumer price index, industrial production, and
unemployment rates. A firm-specific news should have a straight relevance in the revaluation
process of a security price. Furthermore, I extend the previous literature by investigating the
patterns of the transaction cost components around the news arrivals. Therefore, I provide
empirical evidence on the possible existence of information asymmetry and other market
frictions around information events.3
Another contribution of my study is to show the mechanism of liquidity provision
during trading periods, as characterized by uncertainty on the asset values. The current trend
towards the automation of trading systems and limit order book markets raises pertinent
questions about the efficiency of such a market structure. Theoretically, a liquid market ensures
that trades of any volume size will be executed immediately, and without price impacts. In
practice, if there is severe uncertainty on asset values, market liquidity could sharply decrease.
Most of the previous literature provides evidence on price fluctuations around news releases
(e.g. Patell and Wolfson, 1984). By analyzing order-flow components such as bid-ask spread
and order volume imbalance, I provide new evidence on liquidity provision in limit order book
markets.
The main results are as follows. First, the market responds to news release arrivals by
supplying a significant extent of liquidity. In fact, the spread is very tight and the limit order
book is thick. However, order imbalance, trade frequency, and spread tightness are highest
immediately before and after the news release arrivals. The price impact also begins ten minutes
before the Reuters news releases and lasts for at least thirty minutes. I analyze several possible
explanations for the premature market movements. Among other arguments, I discuss the
existence of rumors and private information, the availability of many information sources, and
different information screening processes.
Second, my paper shows the existence of significant transaction cost components in
limit order book markets. The order processing cost appears to be the largest component.
Adverse selection and the autocorrelation components are smaller, but are nevertheless
substantial. Also, adverse selection costs decrease with market liquidity and the rate of public
information arrivals.
Third, I analyze the patterns of the cost components around the public information
disclosure. Adverse selection and order processing costs appear lower than the unconditional
estimates. This evidence suggests that asymmetric information have a weak relevance in the
disclosure impact. The low order processing cost suggests a high degree of competitiveness in
the liquidity supply.
Finally, this research suggests that microstructure models may provide awkward results.
The empirical findings coming from the estimation models of transaction cost components
critically depend on the main assumptions underpinning these models. Further research should
investigate the reliability of the cost components measures.4
Introduction
How is the arrival of public information releases related to the change or disruption in the
activities of investors? How do traders react to information releases? How does a market
structure based on voluntary liquidity provision accommodate information events? Are the news
announcements preceded or followed by information asymmetry among traders? In this
research, I address these fundamental questions.
My study is composed of two parts. The first part is an analysis of the price and order
flow reactions to releases of public information. Using the Reuters alerts system, I collect six
months of firm-specific news for a sample of 30 highly liquid French stocks. Analyzing the
trading activity around the exact disclosure times allows me to recognize the patterns of the
market reaction. In the second part of the paper, I investigate the price formation process and
transaction costs around the news release arrivals. To do this, I estimate three models of
transaction cost components. These models provide estimates of adverse selection costs, order
processing costs, and order persistence around the information disclosures.
My paper contributes to the previous literature in many aspects. In the microstructure
literature, liquidity is higher immediately after the opening and immediately before the closing.
Information asymmetry among traders is one of the explanations commonly cited in these
studies. My study examines another possible explanation, that is, that the intraday periods of
high liquidity are associated with high rates of public information releases.
Second, how the information is incorporated in the asset prices is a central issue in
finance. Market efficiency requires that information be publicly available and that prices adjust
immediately to market news. My study analyzes adverse selection costs and price movements
around firm-specific news release arrivals. In doing so, I provide empirical evidence on the
possible existence of information asymmetry and other market frictions around information
events.
This study shows the mechanism of liquidity provision during trading periods, as
characterized by uncertainty on the asset values. Theoretically, a liquid market ensures that
trades of any volume size will be executed immediately, and without price impacts. In practice,
if there is severe uncertainty on asset values, market activity could decrease.
The investigation of liquidity provision in uncertainty moments is relevant for market5
structures based on an open limit order book, such as the Paris Bourse and NYSE. Thus, the
current trend towards the automation of trading systems and limit order book markets raises
pertinent questions about the efficiency of such a market structure. By analyzing the order flow
and transaction cost components around firm-specific news arrivals, this paper provides
insights into limit order book markets.
This study is also a comparative analysis of different models of transaction cost
components, an issue that is strongly debated in the current literature. For instance,
Bessembinder (2000) and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) address the reliability of the
existing algorithms for determining trade direction. Clarke and Shastri (2000) and Van Ness,
Van Ness, and Warr (2001) query how well adverse selection components measure adverse
selection. I add to this debate by comparing three cost components models under different
market conditions.
I propose a model for the estimation of the transaction cost components that respects price
discreteness and yet is sensitive to the protracted effects of the trade process. This model
extends some of the current price formation models based on autoregressive process of the order
flow, e.g., the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans model (1997). The comparative analysis
between my model and two other models of transaction cost components provides insight into
transaction cost measurement and price dynamics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the main features of the market
structure of Paris Bourse and the dataset. In Section 2 I briefly discuss the existing literature on
news releases. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the news impact. Section 4 presents
the three estimation models for the cost components measurement. Section 5 reports the
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
1. Dataset and Market Microstructure
1.A. The Structure of the Paris Bourse
After the structural change in 1995, the Paris Bourse grew impressively. In 1999, the
yearly number of trades were 58,6 million and the total stock market capitalization was around6
€723 billion (Parisbourse, 1999). At the end of 1999, the total market capitalization of the Paris
Bourse was slightly higher than the German market, about half that of its London counterpart,
and less than an eighth of the NYSE market value.
The Paris Bourse is an order-driven market. Its structure is based on a centralized
electronic market with limit order book publicly visible. In a price-driven, market a dealer
making a market for a security provides immediate trades to traders who want to transact
promptly. In a pure order-driven market there is no designed market maker. Some traders
voluntary offer liquidity by filling the order book with limit orders and assuring the viability of
the exchange system. To compensate the liquidity providers, traders are willing to execute an
immediate purchase (sell) trade at a relatively higher (lower) price, i.e., the bid and the ask
quotes. The difference between bid and ask quotes represents the liquidity provider's gross
profit, i.e., their compensation for bearing inventory and adverse selection risks, brokerage
commissions, communication costs, clearing, and other factors.
For highly traded stocks, limit order traders constantly update the limit order book (see
e.g. Bias, Hillion, and Spatt, 1995). The information in the limit order book is publicly
available and disseminated worldwide. In fact, real-time information is routed towards more
than 500,000 terminals.
1 44% of the submitted orders come from overseas terminal traders
(Parisbourse, 2000). Only institutional agents and investment firms, called trading members,
are authorized to enter orders in the Paris Bourse System. Nevertheless, orders can also be
gathered by intermediaries called order collectors, who transmit such orders to trading
members.
The market opens at 9 a.m. and closes at 5:30 p.m.
2 Trading takes place on a continuous
basis. Traders may submit limit orders (à cour limité) indicating the highest (lowest) price at
which they are willing to buy (sell). Otherwise, traders may immediately transact the placement
of two types of market orders, namely, an order at the market price (au prix du marché) or at
any price (à tout prix)
3. The main principle of the order book is the price-time priority rule.
The information in the limit order book is visible on the trading screen for each stock. The
1 The dissemination network is actually even broader than that, because real-time information is also available via
Internet and Minitel.
2 The trading day has been extended recently. In the 1999, hours were 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
3 Two other order types exist, namely the fill-or kill-order (FOK) and the stop limit order (SLO). The FOK order
(“tout ou rien”) must be completely matched in order to create a trade, otherwise it is cancelled. The SLO is a
special limit order that becomes a market order at any price if the market price reaches the limit price.7
information comprises (1) the security symbol, (2) the number of shares traded since the
opening, (3) the price changes between the last trade and the previous day’s close, (4) number
of shares exchanged, and the price and time stamp of the most recent five trades, (5) and the
limit price, number of orders, cumulated order size and time stamp for the five highest bids and
for the five lowest asks, respectively. The state of the order book also determines the block trade
prices applying a weighed average value. To be eligible for the block trade handling, a trade
must have an order size of not less than €75,000.
4 The weighed average price ensures
immediate and full execution to trades with large volumes
5.
The tick sizes are set in four ranges. For a stock prices lower than €50, the tick size is
€0.01, for a stock price from 50.05 to €100 it is €0.05, for a stock price from 100.10 to €500 it
is €0.1, finally, for stock prices higher than €500 it is €0.5. Table 1 shows the tick size of each
stock in the sample. It is noteworthy that several stocks switched from one tick size to another
over the sample period. The change of the tick size is immediate. When a stock’s price crosses
the pre-established threshold prices, the Paris Bourse’s computer system automatically
accomplishes the tick size changes.
1.B. The Database
The database provides time stamp, price, and volumes size of all trades, and time stamp,
cumulated order size, and price quotes of the prevailing bid- and ask quotes
6. Matching these
data, I reconstruct the sequence of the best order changes and trade executions for a 6-month
period from April to September 1999. Using the Lee and Ready’s method (1990), I infer when a
trade is buyer- or seller-initiated. The matching between trade and order data allows me to
reconstruct the state of the limit order book before, after and within the trades.
I analyze thirty highly traded stocks quoted on the Premier Marché, i.e., the market for
large French and foreign companies with a market capitalization at least of €750 million and
25% of capital publicly available. My sample is composed of thirty of the forty stocks
constituting the CAC40 index. For all the sample stocks, Table 1 reports the name, market
4 This block trade price is the average of the best limit order prices weighted by the related order sizes. The
calculation of the weighed price is based on the number of pending orders necessary to match the volume size of
the block trade.
5 The eligible securities for block trade handling are all the components of the CAC40 index and the other stocks
with a similar extent of market capitalization.
6 The Paris Bourse denotes the files containing the trade and the best orders information with the names BDM1D18
capitalization, price change over the sample period, average daily number of trades, and average
daily trading volume. This table shows that my sample stocks are extremely liquid. In fact, the
daily average of number of trades and the average daily turnover in my sample is higher than
that in a similar NYSE sample analyzed in Venkataraman (2001).
Table 1 also reports the average values of the bid-ask spread. I denote t A and t B the
prevailing ask and the bid quotes at time t. Then, () 2 / B A M t t t + = is the corresponding
midquote price in t, and () t t t B A QS − = is the Quoted Spread, a rough measure of the gross
profit for providing liquidity, or, in other words, the cost of a round-trip trade. Table 1 shows
the difference in the Quoted Spread across stocks, starting from a minimum of €0.036 for the
Usinor stock to a maximum of €1.219 for the Promodes stock. To compare Quoted Spreads, I
can standardize them through the Percentage Relative Spread, t t t MS / QS PRS = .T h el a r g e s t
and the smallest values of the Percentage Relative Spread are 0.305 and 0.127. The spread
statistics in my sample are in line with the most liquid stocks in the CAC 40 (Declerck, 2000;
Jong, Nijman and Röell, 1995) and with the lowest Percentage Relative Spread in the NYSE
(e.g., Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997).
Table 1 also describes the sample of firm-specific news gathered through the alert system
of the Reuters 2000 service. The Reuters alert system provides information release services. A
user can request to be notified on various information, such as macroeconomics news, subject-
specific, or firm-specific news. I requested notification only of firm-specific news for the thirty
stocks in my sample. From April to September 1999, I recorded date, time stamp, and news
headlines for a total of more than 4,900 firm-specific news releases. Since the thirty stocks are
members of the CAC 40 index, much of the news that concerns the CAC 40 index may indeed
be firm-specific news relative to one of the index members. I infer that the news primarily refers
to the CAC index by identifying specific words such as CAC or index in the headlines. I then
construct a subsample of purely firm-specific news, i.e., without any explicit reference to the
CAC 40 index. Throughout this paper, I will refer to index-related news when the news
primarily refers to the index and to strictly firm-specific news when the news primarily refers to
the firm.
Table 1 shows the number of firm-specific news, index-related news, and total news
releases for each stock. Total releases are 1031 index-related news and 3898 firm-specific
and BDM2D2, respectively. 9
information releases. There is a wide dispersion of number of news releases in the sample. For
instance, only 12 releases referred to Legrand but 677 referred to Elf.
2. Literature on News Releases
The investigation of news release arrivals has drawn much attention in the financial
literature. The link between information and changes in trading activity has been analyzed from
many standpoints. This section is a partial and incomplete survey on the existing literature. I
will only refer to those few papers closely related to my study.
The study of effects of information disclosures is a central topic in accounting literature
(see Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for a survey of the empirical and
theoretical literature). However, my study differs from the accounting approach in many
aspects. The accounting literature is mainly interested in disclosures by the firms, namely,
financial reporting, and on the impact of disclosure on the cost of capital (e.g. Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991) and the price formation process and order flow are marginal. I address a
broader set of firm-specific news. My study differs significantly from the body of the financial
literature that examines the effects of macroeconomic news. See, for example, Almeida,
Goodhart and Payne (1998), Ederington and Lee (1993), and Jain (1988). These studies analyze
the response to announcements on macroeconomic variables such as the consumer price index,
industrial production, and unemployment rates. I instead study firm-specific news.
To my knowledge, the studies more closely related to my research are Berry and Howe
(1994) and Patell and Wolfson (1984). As in Berry and Howe, I analyze the impact of public
information released from the Reuters News Service. However, Berry and Howe cluster all news
release arrivals. Instead, using the alert system, I focus only on firm-specific news. Furthermore,
Berry and Howe examine the combined effects of all information events on the aggregate
market, i.e., the S&P 500 Index. I analyze the link between firm-specific news and the trading
on the related stock asset.
My research is also significantly different from Patell and Wolfson (1984). In their study,
Patell and Wolfson analyze how Broad Tape news releases of earnings and dividend10
announcements affect three aspects of intraday stock price behavior: mean returns, returns
variance, and serial correlation in consecutive price changes. My analysis includes order-flow
components such as bid-ask spread and order volume imbalance, and other trading indicators
such as the trading volumes. Furthermore, I extend the previous literature by measuring the
behavior of the transaction cost components around the news arrivals.
3. Order Flow Around News Arrivals
I now analyze the trading activity around the arrival of public news releases. I base my
analysis on the average sample values of order flow components and trading activity. I
decompose the trading day and the intraday periods around information arrivals into ten-minute
intervals. For the trading activity, I calculate price changes, return volatility, transaction
volume, and intratrade time duration. Price changes are the transaction price difference between
the last and first trade of each ten-minute interval. I calculate return volatility by using the
method of Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001). This method squares the log price changes and sums up
the square returns over the intraday intervals. Trading volume is the mean value of the number
of shares exchanges in all the trades that occurred in ten minutes. The intratrade duration is the
mean value of the time elapsed between the successive transactions over ten minutes. The order
flow values are the order data in the book before the occurrence of the trade. From the order
data, I calculate the indicators the quoted bid-ask spread, the order volume imbalance, and the
probability of trade continuation. As before, these measures are the average values of the order
data that precede all the trades that occurred over the ten-minute intervals. I measure the spread
as the difference between the prevailing ask and bid quotes. The order volume imbalance is the
absolute value of the difference between the volume pending at the best ask and bid. I calculate
the probability of trade continuation by using the frequency of two subsequent trades in the
same direction, i.e., two successive buys or sells.
Table 2 shows the comparisons between the unconditional values and average sample
values conditional on the time of the news release arrivals. The conditional values comprise six
ten-minute intervals, namely, the three periods before and the three periods after the news
release arrivals. The time of the news release arrival establishes the beginning of the fourth11
interval, i.e., the time interval denoted as “news-10” in Table 2, 3, and 5. The unconditional
values are the measures of order flow and trading activity explained above, but using the entire
time series.
3. A. Intraday Patterns of News Arrivals
The first question I address is whether the news release arrivals have an intraday
seasonality and whether firm-specific news has different patterns relative index-related news.
Figure 1 shows that the release of index-related news occurs mostly around markets openings
and closings. In fact, much of the index-related information corresponds to a news bulletin of
index reactions to earlier events, such as the Paris Bourse or NYSE openings.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that private information has a central role in the
formation of moments of high liquidity. Figure 1, combined with the significantly positive
correlation coefficients between the number of news releases and liquidity proxies over half-
hour periods, suggests that liquidity peaks may also be driven by flows of public information to
the market. The correlation between the cumulated number of all news and number of trades per
half-hour is 0.51, and the correlation with return volatility is 0.19. Using the cumulated number
of strictly firm specific news only, i.e., excluding the index-related news, the correlation
between number of news and number of trades is 0.67, and the correlation between number of
news and volatility is 0.33.
3. B. Price Dynamics
In analyzing price dynamics around news arrivals, one of the main questions is whether
the price reacts immediately or through a protracted process. Verrecchia (2001) shows that in
terms of price reaction, the “disclosure surprise” depends on the precision of the information
disclosure and, overall, on the uncertainty about the fundamental asset value. Table 2 provides
empirical support for the existence of such a disclosure surprise. Absolute price changes around
news arrivals have significant higher values. In fact, the average size of the absolute price
changes over the ten minutes after the public information arrivals is around 0.32 but the
unconditional value is 0.27.
I emphasize that the significant price movements are already observable ten minutes12
before the news arrival. There are two potential reasons for this. First, Reuters gathers several
information sources. Hence, at the time of the Reuters announcement, the information might
already be partially known. Second, some traders either trade on rumors or are better informed
than others. The evidence of price movements before the news arrival time suggests the
existence of heterogeneous information sources and information screening processes. The
extraordinary price movements last until thirty minutes after the release, although their
magnitude declines substantially twenty minutes after the disclosure. Patell and Wolfson (1984)
find that the process of price revision lasts ten to fifteen minutes. My results suggest instead
that the process of price revision lasts longer.
The findings based on measures of price change volatility are consistent with those based
on absolute price changes. The price sensitivity is a decreasing function of the precision of the
public information and an increasing function of the extent of noise trading (e.g., Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991). If the noise trading were constant in the pre- and post-announcement
environment, I would observe a decrease in volatility due to the higher precision of the public
information. But Table 2 shows that return volatility is higher than the unconditional value from
ten minutes before to at least twenty minutes after the information event. Some possible reasons
are that traders trade on noise or private information before the news release, or traders need
time to disentangle the information contents.
3. C. Trading Volume
The demand for immediate execution increases around public information arrivals. This
evidence is observable both in terms of number of trades and transaction size. Table 2 shows
that the intra-trade duration shortens suggesting a shorter time expected to be executed. Large
trading volume is a sign of heterogeneous expectations (Verrecchia, 2001) across investors, and
is due to differences in opinions, endowments and information. The evidence in Table 2 shows
that heterogeneous beliefs characterize the trading activity even before the disclosure,
suggesting that the information disclosure is at least partly expected. However, the widest
market impact in terms of transaction volumes occurs within twenty minutes after the news
release.13
3. D. Liquidity Provision
Another important question is if liquidity traders shade their limit orders and weaken the
liquidity provision around information uncertainty. Several statistics in Table 2 seem to rule out
this hypothesis. The liquidity traders continue to assure a high liquidity provision even after the
news disclosure. The spread size around the information arrival is smaller than the normal
value. The smallest spread size occurs soon after news release arrivals. This evidence suggests a
high competition among limit order traders who actively overbid and undercut the best quotes,
thus assuring low transaction costs to the market order traders. This evidence supports Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel (2001) who show that undercutting/overbidding strategy is attractive when
the proportion of limit order traders is high.
Order imbalances can be used as a proxy of market depth. However, imbalances also
signal the aggressiveness of one side of the market compared to the other. Parlour (1998) shows
that the thickness of one side of the book strengthens (weakens) aggressiveness in the same
(opposite) side of the book. Table 2 shows that order imbalances increase until ten minutes after
the news disclosure, and remain high. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2000) show that the order
imbalance reflects the prevalence of one side of the market, i.e., the group of traders who
believe that the asset is under- or overvalued. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari also show that in a
competitive environment, the dominance of one group leads to a tightening of the spread.
Table 2 provides evidence that the autocorrelation of the trade direction increases around
public information arrivals. These results support the argument in Bias, Hillion, and Spatt
(1995), who argue that traders react similarly, but successively, to the same events. The higher
trade continuation is another signal that the price adjustment follows a lasting process of value
revision.
3. E. Extreme Price Changes
Another relevant question is if the information arrival engenders extreme price
movements. The results in Table 3 provide some insights to this question. Table 3 shows the
absolute and relative frequencies of the magnitudes of the trade-by-trade price changes in tick
size. As in Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992), I divide the price change sizes in nine
categories: when the price falls (jumps) four ticks or less (more), when the price goes down (up)
three ticks, down (up) two ticks, down (up) one tick, and, finally, when the price is unchanged.14
Table 3 shows that the unconditional return distribution has fatter tails than it does around news
arrivals. Price changes around news release arrivals are not driven by extreme price movements,
but by price changes from zero to two ticks. This result provides further evidence on the high
liquidity provision assured by the limit order traders. The thickness of the book and the
tightness of the spread guarantees narrow price changes in the price adjustment process.
Another interesting result in Table 3 is that the return distribution depends significantly
on the tick size range. The occurrence of extreme price change appears more likely when the
quotation of a stock is within the first range of tick size, i.e. from zero to €50. The frequency of
price changes equal or wider than four ticks is 14% in the first tick size range and 2% or 3% in
the other three tick size ranges. This result is difficult to interpret. Apparently, it is not due to
some distinctive characteristics of the stocks in the first tick size range. A possible reason can
be that traders trading in these stocks tend to submit more frequently limit orders with limit
prices rounded off to five Cents. Christie and Schultz (1994) find that dealers in the NASDAQ
avoid submitting odd-eighth quotes. It is possible that the cheapest stocks in the Paris Bourse
have a similar anomaly. As in the NASDAQ, liquidity providers may implicitly collude to
maintain wide spread. The size of my sample and the objectives of my paper do not allow me to
examine further this issue. Here, I can only observe that all the four stocks in the first tick size
range have a Percentage Quoted Spread higher than the sample median value (see Table 1).
4. Price Formation Models and Cost Components Estimation
I estimate the transaction cost components using three models of transaction cost
components. To do this, I use the Lin, Sanger and Booth model (1995) (hereafter LSB) and the
Glosten and Harris model (1988) (hereafter GH), and I propose an Autoregressive model that I
call the AR model. Throughout this section, I will shortly explain the main features of the GH
model (1988) and the LSB model (1995). In the last part of this section, I present the AR model.
4.A. The Glosten and Harris Model (1988)
Id e f i n e t x the trade direction where 1 x t + = if the trade in t is a buy and 1 x t − = if it is15
a sell. Denoting the prevailing ask and bid quotes in t as t A and t B , the midquote price is
() 2 / B A m t t t + = and the half-effective spread is () 2 / B A s t t t − = . t V denotes the transaction
volume in number of shares. The cost components are φ and θ, which denote order processing
costs and adverse selection costs.
I employ the simplified version of the GH model (as presented in the original paper of
Glosten and Harris (1988), Table 2, page 136). The GH model assumes a linear price impact of
trading volume and a fixed cost of executing a trade. According to my notations, the price
change relates to the transaction volume and cost as follows:
t 1 t t t t t s s V x p ε + φ − φ + θ = ∆ − (1)
where t ε is the i.i.d. residual. Therefore, this model divides the transaction cost into two
components. The first component, φ, allows the liquidity provider to generate revenue to cover
inventory costs and clearing fees. In the spirit of the Glosten and Harris model, this cost
component is transitory and does not affect the fundamental value of an asset. The second
component, θ, compensates the liquidity provider for the risk of transacting against a trader
with superior information. The adverse selection component has a permanent impact on the
asset price.
De Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996) propose a similar econometric specification of the
Glosten model (1994) in which both the adverse selection cost and the order processing cost
linearly depend on trade volume size. Såndas (2001) also bases his statistical model on Glosten
(1994) and relates order size to private information.
4.B. The Lin, Sanger, and Booth Model (1995)
The central idea in the LSB model is that the adverse selection component affects the true
price, but the order processing cost affects the transaction price. The LSB model assumes that
the gross profit for a liquidity provider corresponds to the effective spread. A proportion θ of
the effective spread t s compensates the liquidity traders against possible adverse selection.
Hence, the expected transaction price in 1 t + equals the transaction price in t plus () t s θ .T h e
LSB specification implies that the midquote price, t m , is the proxy of the true asset value and
that the adverse selection component affects the asset true value:16
() 1 t t 1 t u s m + + + θ = ∆ (2)
where 1 t u + is a disturbance term. Contrary to the adverse selection cost, the order
processing cost and order persistence affect the transaction price rather than the midquote price.
Therefore, the LSB model derives the order persistence by estimating the first-lag
autocorrelation of the effective spread.
() 1 t t 1 t s s + + η + ρ = (3)
where 1 t+ η is a disturbance term. The order processing cost is the residual of the θ and φ
components. The order processing costs affect the transaction price as follows:
() 1 t t 1 t s p + + ζ + φ − = ∆ (4)
where 1 t+ ξ is a disturbance term and ρ − θ − = φ 1 reflects the order processing. The LSB
model assumes that the disturbance terms t u , t η and t ζ are uncorrelated.
4.C. The Autoregressive Model
The AR model is a generalization of the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997)
(hereafter MRR) model. The main features of the MRR model are that the change in the true
value of an asset from t-1 and t can be due to a non-trading event, such as the arrival of new
public information, or a trading event, such as an innovation in the order flow. The arrival of
new public information is associated with a public news announcement represented by the i.i.d
innovation t u . For a trading event, the revision is due to the unexpected order flow. The true
value changes in proportion to the deviation between expected order flow, [] 1 t t x x E − ,a n dt h e
actual order flow, t x . Consistent with the previous notation, I call this proportion θ.I t
represents the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent impact of the order flow
innovation. Hence, the true value process can be expressed as follows:
[] () t 1 t t t 1 t t u x x E x + − θ + µ = µ − − (5)
The second main assumption in the MRR model is that the transaction price, t p ,
corresponds to the efficient price plus a component that impounds various microstructure
effects:17
() t t t t x p ε + φ + µ = (6)
Intuitively, φ represents the order processing cost that can be interpreted as the liquidity
provider's compensation for inventory costs and clearing fees. Also, t ε denotes the i.i.d.
residual term with mean zero that embodies the effect of stochastic rounding and errors induced
by price discreteness. The residual terms in Equation (5) and (6) are uncorrelated.
The third main assumption in the MRR model is that the order flow follows a general
Markov chain process. To see this point, I assume that at time t, a sell occurs and thus the
transaction price is at the bid. The probability of order persistence, i.e., two subsequent buys or
sells, is equal to δ and the probability of reversal order is δ − 1 . In this example, the probability
that the trade in 1 t + occurs at the ask and at the bid is δ − 1 and δ .L e tλ represent the
unconditional probability that the transaction price occurs within the spread, i.e., () 0 x Pr t = .I





















δ λ λ − δ −
λ − λ λ −















Appendix 1 shows the property of the transition matrix P. I denote () () λ − − δ = ρ 1 2 .T h e
conditional expectation of the trade direction at time 1 t + , given the trade direction in t, is:
[]) x ( x x E t t 1 t ρ = + (8)
Combining Equation (5) and (6) with (8), the main estimation equation of the MRR
model is
()( ) t 1 t t t x x p ξ + θρ + φ − θ + φ = ∆ − (9)
where 1 t t t t u − ε − ε + = ξ clusters all the residual terms of the true and transaction prices. I note
that the idea that the unexpected rather than the actual order flow captures the information
asymmetry expressed in Equation (1) goes back to Hasbrouck (1988, 1991).
The crucial point in the MRR model is to assume that the order flow follows a Markov
Chain and to allow only a one-lag autocorrelation in the order flow. However, Hasbrouck
(1991) provides empirical evidence on lasting price and order dynamics. After comparing
different models of transaction cost components, de Jong, Nijman and Röell (1996) conclude18
that a one-period empirical implementation underestimates the price effects of trading.
Let me assume that the order flow follows a more general autoregressive process. The
conditional expectation in Equation (8) can be generalized as follows.
[] t
k
t k t x x x E ρ = + (10)
See Appendix 1 for more details. The statistical properties in Equation (10) establish that
() k t tx x Cov − depends only on k. By the Wold theorem (Hamilton, 1995), the order flow






− ε ψ =
0 j
j t j t x (11)




j .T h et e r mε is white noise representing the error made in
forecasting t x on the basis of a linear function of lagged t x :
() ,... x , x x E ˆ x 2 t 1 t t t t − − − = ε (12)
According to Equation (10) and (12), I can generalize the MRR model’s expression of











ρ − θ + µ = µ  − − (13)
To find a straightforward representation of the estimation equation, I limit the
autoregressive decaying impact of the order flow to two lags. This assumption is consistent with
the previous findings in the literature that the significant level in the AR process of the trade
indicator series achieves two or, at maximum, three, lags. Equation (9) of the MRR model
becomes:
()( ) t 2 t
2
1 t t t x x x p ξ + θ ρ − θρ + φ − θ + φ + α = ∆ − − (14)
As before, 1 t t t t u − ζ − ζ + = ξ clusters all the residual terms of the true price and the
transaction price. The constant α represents the expected change in the asset value. The AR
7 Here I show the purely linearly indeterministic process where only a linearly indeterministic component
constitutes the MA process in Equation (11). The same result holds when a linearly deterministic component is
involved.19
representation makes the price formation process more robust for many microstructure
imperfections that engender lagged effects. In fact, the literature provides evidence on price
discreteness effects (e.g., Harris, 1994), inventory consequences (e.g., Stoll, 1989), lasting
adjustments to information (e.g., Patell and Wolfson, 1984), and other strategic behaviors
effects, such as the splitting strategy that induces dilutions in the price impacts or price
smoothing effects.
I estimate the AR price formation model by applying the ordered probit model. Hausman,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) propose this technique for analyzing the price change dynamics, but
not for measuring transaction cost components. As described above, I rank the price changes in
nine intervals containing the entire possible price change sizes.
Let t p ~ ∆ be the unobservable continuous variable denoting the price changes from t-1 to t.
The partition of the state space allows for mapping price changes in n discrete values. Hence,
t p ∆ is the discrete dependent variable or the observable price change values. Consistent with
Equation (14), let α and i β for i=1,..3 be the coefficients related to the regressors t x , 1 t x − and
2 t x − . The expression of the ordered probit regression is as follows:
t 2 t 3 1 t 2 t 1 t x x x p ~ ξ + β + β + β + α = ∆ − − (15)
4 n 2 for


















ticks n t ticks 1 n
tick 1 t tick 1
ticks m t ticks 1 m
ticks 4 t
t
+ ≤ ≤ +
− ≤ ≤ −
<∝ ∆ ≤ γ
γ < ∆ ≤ γ
γ < ∆ < γ
γ ≤ ∆ < γ


















Equation (15) refers to the probit regression in which t ξ is the i.n.i.d residual.
Expression (16) shows the state-space partition and ticks 4 − γ to ticks 4 + γ are the related thresholds
setting the price change sizes in ticks. Table 4 reports the statistics for the estimates of the entire
sample. Assuming Gaussian residuals t ξ , I can easily obtain the conditional distribution of
t p ~ ∆ .20
5. Empirical Findings on Transaction Costs
To analyze the estimates of the transaction costs I consider two main objectives. My first
objective is to gauge the transaction cost components in the limit order book of the Paris
Bourse. I estimate the cost components using the GH, LSB, and the AR models. I compare these
estimates and I examine how they relate to one another and to market liquidity proxies. My
second objective is to investigate the behavior of transaction cost components around public
information arrivals. To do this, I estimate the transaction cost components conditional on
several time intervals around the news arrivals.
5.A. The Transaction Cost Components in the Paris Bourse
The unconditional estimates of the transaction cost components in Table 5 provide
evidence on the existence of adverse selection cost, order processing cost, and order persistence
in limit order book markets
8. Based on the three models estimated, the order processing cost
appears to be the largest component. Adverse selection and the autocorrelation components are
smaller, but are nevertheless substantial. Let us analyze each estimation model of transaction
cost components.
5.A.1. The GH model
The estimates in the GH model indicate that the average volume impact of thousand
shares on trade prices is 0.003. Since the average volume size exchanged in a trade is 565
shares and the average absolute price change is €0.273 (see Table 2), I can estimate an average
volume impact by the value of a thousand shares equal to €0.017. Panel B in Table 5 shows the
cost components in euro value as the proportional parts of the quoted spread. Thus, the adverse
selection and the transitory cost components are €0.005 and €0.189, respectively. This evidence
means that the order processing cost is the main cost component. My estimates are in line with
Såndas (2001) who analyzes the transaction costs in the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
The GH model has at least three limitations. First, this model restricts the decomposition
of transaction cost to two components. It assumes that both trade directions are equally likely
8 See, e.g., Declerck (2000) and de Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996) for the Paris Bourse, Brockman and Chung
(1999) for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Såndas (2001) for Stockholm Stock Exchange.21
and rules out the presence of order persistence. Second, it assumes that the adverse selection
component depends linearly on order size. In contrast, the previous literature provides evidence
on the nonlinearity and convexity of the price impact of trading volume (e.g. Hasbrouck, 1991;
Kim and Kon, 1999). Third, the GH model assumes that the order size proxies for private
information. In contrast, informed traders may disguise their superior information with strategic
behaviors such as the order splitting strategy.
5.A.2. The LSB model
Table 5 shows that the average estimates from the LSB model of the adverse selection
cost, order processing and order persistence are 0.27, 0.48, and 0.25, respectively. Panel B in
Table 5 shows that the average values of the adverse selection cost, order processing, and order
persistence are €0.04, €0.07, and €0.03, respectively.
Brockman and Chung (1999) use the LSB model to measure the transaction cost
components in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Brockman and Chung’s results agree with my
estimates. Van Ness et al. (2001) use the LSB model to estimate the adverse selection
component in the NYSE. Their estimates are significantly higher than the results in Table 5.
The difference could be due to differences in the sample characteristics (bias of my sample
toward high capitalization companies) or market microstructure reasons.
Perhaps the LSB model is only a rough proxy of the transaction cost components. First, by
construction, the model reduces all the possible factors by composing the spread to three
components. Also, the order processing cost is the residual of two other components, namely,
the adverse selection and the order persistence. Second, the LSB model assumes that the
midquote price at t+1 represents the expected asset value at t. As expressed in Equation (2), this
assumption allows a straightforward estimation of the adverse selection cost through the
correlation between the effective spread and the midquote price changes. However, I can
question the observability of the expected true value.
5.A.3. The AR model
The AR model provides estimates of transaction cost components consistent with the
literature (e.g. Stoll, 1989; Declerck, 2000; de Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996); and Huang and
Stoll, 1997). Table 3 shows the main statistics of the ordered probit regression and confirms the
significance of the first and second lags in the order flow. Table 5 shows that the average
estimates coming from the AR model of the adverse selection cost, order processing, and order22
persistence are 0.41, 0.56, and 0.25, respectively. A comparison with the estimates based on the
LSB model shows that the magnitude of the order processing cost and the adverse selection cost
is higher in the AR model. The same considerations hold for the euro values of the cost
components. The order persistence estimates are similar and, overall, consistent with the
literature (e.g. Stoll, 1989; Declerck, 2000; Huang and Stoll, 1997).
5.A.4. Correlations between transaction cost components
As I expected, the number of firm-specific news releases and proxies for stock liquidity
are positively correlated. The correlations between the number of news releases and market
capitalization and the number of daily trades and percentage quoted spread are, respectively,
0.74, 0.70, and –0.54 (see Table 6). This evidence is consistent with previous findings of a
positive link between market capitalization and information flow through different sources,
such as press and analysts (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995).
Table 6 also shows the correlations among the estimated costs resulting from the three
models. This table suggests that the three models provide divergent estimations of the cost
components. The estimates of the adverse selection cost component in the LSB and in the AR
models are negatively correlated. Clarke and Shastri (2000) and Van Ness et al. (2001) also find
some inconsistencies among estimates of information asymmetry costs. On the contrary, the
estimates of order persistence and processing cost in the LSB model agree with those in the AR
model.
The correlations between market liquidity and the estimates of the adverse selection cost
in the GH and AR model are negative. The higher information availability makes easier and
more transparent the valuation of larger companies. Other studies support this argument.
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) use the number of analysts following the stock as a proxy
for the supply of information about firm. They find that greater analyst coverage tends to reduce
adverse selection costs. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that investment opportunities constitute
the chance for exploiting private information. They show that managers of high growth firms
have superior knowledge about the firm’s investment opportunity set.
The correlations between order processing costs and liquidity proxies are positive. I would
expect a negative linkage at least for two reasons. First, if economies of scale play a role in
transaction costs, then I expect to observe smaller trading costs in high liquid stocks. Second,
more liquid stocks attract discretionary liquidity traders, since these traders can share the23
asymmetric information risk. This mechanism enhances the competitiveness in providing
liquidity and thereby reduces the order processing cost. However, the correlation statistics in
Table 6 do not support these arguments. In fact, the order processing cost estimates from the
LSB and the AR models are positively associated with liquidity.
The LSB and the AR models yield opposite correlations between order persistence and
liquidity proxies. The AR model suggests that order autocorrelation is higher for the most liquid
stocks. This result supports the idea that the higher trade frequency of more liquid stocks drives
a higher degree of order persistence. Empirical evidence in Huang and Stoll (1997) supports
these findings.
5.B. Transaction Cost Components and News Arrivals
The estimation of the cost components around public information arrivals provides
straightforward proxies of the adverse selection cost, order processing cost, and autocorrelation
components over intraday periods characterized by uncertainty on the asset values. Table 5
shows the estimates of the cost components conditional on information events. Using piecewise
dummy variables, I estimate the transaction cost components in six ten-minute time intervals
around the public information arrivals. Equation (15) is transformed as follows:
t
j
j , 2 t j , 3 j
j
j , 1 t j , 2 j
j
j , t j , 1 j t x d x d x d p ~ ξ + β + β + β + α = ∆    − − (17)
where j=1,…6 refers to the ten-minute interval around the news arrival and dj refers to the
piecewise dummy variable for the j time interval. I use a similar transformation for the LSB and
GH regressions.
The descriptive analysis in the previous section suggests that the disclosure impact is not
due to a lack of liquidity. The conditional analysis of the cost components is relevant to
recognizing the role of adverse selection costs, order processing costs, and order persistence
around information disclosures. The estimation of the cost components allows us to address the
following questions. First, does the pre-announcement trading is characterized by higher
adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry? Does the high liquidity provision
immediately after the news arrival increase the competitiveness in providing liquidity and
thereby decrease the order processing costs? Does the release of a public information produce
the persistence of trading in one direction?24
5.B.1. Adverse Selection Costs
The first indication from Table 5 is that, according to the LSB and the AR models, the
adverse selection costs around information releases are generally lower than the normal value.
This evidence suggests a lower risk of information asymmetry. On the contrary, the estimates
from the GH model indicate that the volume price impact and the related adverse selection are
strongly higher over the all time intervals around disclosure. However, the GH model confines
the adverse selection to volume impact.
There is no clear indication on which time interval around the news arrival adverse
selection costs best characterizes the trading. However, all three models suggest that the highest
adverse selection costs occur before the news release. This finding appears to be consistent with
the significant price and volume movements preceding the information disclosure reported in
Table 2.
5.B.2. Order Processing Costs
The order processing costs around public information arrivals are lower than the
unconditional estimates. However, the LSB and AR models still provide different results. The
LSB model seems to indicate that the trading characterized by information disclosure has order
processing costs slightly higher than the regular trading. According to the AR model, order
processing costs are instead lower than the normal values. The estimates in the AR model
appear to be more consistent with the descriptive analysis in Table 2. In fact, the higher
competitiveness in providing liquidity around the public information arrival suggests smaller
order processing costs.
The estimates from the three models show that order processing costs tend to decrease
between the pre-announcement and the post-announcement. This evidence further supports the
idea that the competitiveness in providing liquidity brings to tighter compensation for limit
order traders.
5.B.3. Order Persistence
The descriptive analysis in Table 2 shows a higher probability of trade continuation
around news releases. The estimates of order persistence component from the AR model support
the findings, but the LSB model fails to capture a higher autocorrelation in trade direction.
Estimates in Table 5 show that that order persistence is slightly higher before the public25
information arrivals. This evidence may be interpreted as early process of price adjustment and,
therefore, could be a sign of information asymmetry. However, it is not clear that these results
are significant.
The divergent results among the three models raise several questions. I can ask if
microstructure models are sensitive enough to gauge the transaction cost components over
periods of uncertainty. Some of the results presented in this section cast doubt on the
effectiveness of the microstructure models in estimating transaction cost components.
6. Conclusions
My research provides a descriptive analysis of the market behavior around the news
release arrivals. Second, it investigates the transaction cost components around the public
information arrivals. Using the Reuters alert system, I collect six months of firm-specific news
for thirty highly liquid stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse. Matching the news releases with the
data of the intraday trading activity, I analyze the market behavior around disclosure time.
The main results are as follows. First, this study shows the characteristics of the trading
around news arrivals. The market responds to news release arrivals by supplying a significant
extent of liquidity. In fact, the spread is very tight and the limit order book is thick. However,
order imbalance, trade frequency, and spread tightness are highest immediately before and after
the news release arrivals. The price impact also begins ten minutes before the Reuters news
releases and lasts for at least thirty minutes.
I analyze several possible explanations for the premature market movements. Among
other arguments, I discuss the existence of rumors and private information, the availability of
many information sources, and different information screening processes. The volume impact is
highest from ten to twenty minutes after the news arrivals. The behavior of trading volume
provides further evidence on the existence of heterogeneous beliefs and interpretations about
the information contents and asset values.
Second, this paper shows the existence of significant transaction cost components in limit
order book markets. Based on the three models estimated, the order processing cost appears to26
be the largest component. Adverse selection and the autocorrelation components are smaller,
but are nevertheless substantial. Also, adverse selection costs decrease with market liquidity and
the rate of public information arrivals.
Finally, I analyze the behavior of the cost components around the public information
disclosure. The adverse selection cost component appears lower than the unconditional
estimates. This evidence suggests that asymmetric information have a weak relevance in the
disclosure impact. However, the magnitude of the adverse selection is slightly higher before,
rather than after, the news release arrivals. I interpret this evidence as a reduction of information
asymmetry from the pre-news to the post-news environment. Order processing costs are
apparently smaller around news release arrivals. This result provides further evidence on the
high degree of competitiveness in the liquidity supply. Order processing costs appear to be
consistently lower in the post-announcement period, i.e., when the demand of immediate
execution increases.
This research suggests that microstructure models may provide awkward results. The
empirical findings coming from the estimation models of transaction cost components critically
depend on the main assumptions underpinning these models. For instance, the assumption that
the adverse selection cost depends on trade size or on trade direction yields different results.
Further research should investigate the reliability of the cost components measures.27
Appendix 1: Specifications for the AR model
The occupancy probability matrix at time t of the transition matrix t P has the property



















I calculate the steady state variance of t x as ()( ) λ − = 1 x Var t and the covariance and the
correlation between t x and 1 t x − as, respectively:
() [] () () () λ − − δ λ − = = − − 1 2 1 x x E x , x Cov 1 t t 1 t t (A.2)
()( ) ρ = λ − − δ = − 1 2 x , x Corr 1 t t (A.3)
The covariance in (A.2) and the correlation in (A.3) can be also expressed as:
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Accordingly, the lagged covariance and correlation are:
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Table 1: Description of the Sample. For each stock, the table shows company name, price
change over the sample period from April to September 1999, average daily number of trades,
average trade size in number of shares, average transaction price in €, quoted spread as the
difference between the ask- and bid-quotes, and percentage quoted spread (quoted spread
divided by the midquote price). The table also reports the total number of firm-specific news
releases by the Reuters news alert system. The total number of news (in “All News” column) is
the sum of the news that are strictly firm-specific (“Firm News”) and index-related news
(“Index News”). The index-related news refers to the CAC 40 and thus concerns the index stock
components. The Paris Bourse has four tick size ranges. The “Tick Range” column shows
within which tick size range stocks are quoted across the sample period.












Accor 8830 -6% 564 144 232.4 0.424 0.170 11 34 45 3
Agf 9928 4% 346 325 48.2 0.082 0.166 6 71 77 1/2
Air Liquid 13771 3% 766 216 147.2 0.282 0.196 16 75 91 3
Alcatel 45307 9% 1360 758 119.8 0.204 0.158 41 130 171 3
Axa 48925 -7% 1199 945 120.0 0.178 0.145 22 283 305 3
BNP 41204 -6% 962 891 77.7 0.129 0.127 120 446 566 2
Canal + 18142 -16% 443 206 176.4 0.455 0.255 41 142 183 2/3
Cap Gemini 19521 -4% 762 344 151.8 0.276 0.176 37 42 79 3
Ccf 9072 43% 415 269 105.5 0.263 0.251 35 83 118 2/3
Dexia 6609 8% 444 127 127.3 0.252 0.189 5 31 36 3
Elf
Aquitaine
42359 34% 1296 961 140.8 0.230 0.149 125 552 677 3
Eridania 2771 -15% 321 50 131.6 0.344 0.254 6 34 40 3
France
Telecom
134532 4% 2097 1643 73.5 0.099 0.134 111 422 533 2
Danone 17171 6% 667 226 247.2 0.330 0.129 10 60 70 3
Lagardere 6610 38% 526 522 36.6 0.079 0.216 26 72 98 1
Legrand 5985 11% 294 45 209.3 0.575 0.269 5 7 12 3
LVMH 43556 18% 693 225 259.9 0.437 0.158 23 165 188 3
Michelin 5254 8% 568 460 42.5 0.089 0.191 15 45 60 1
L’Oreal 53848 6% 723 109 610.3 1.050 0.163 7 20 27 4
Peugeot 10249 37% 494 230 159.3 0.283 0.188 29 87 116 3
Pinault 31156 16% 604 234 157.2 0.343 0.203 10 86 96 3
Promodes 20502 48% 416 56 662.5 1.219 0.176 21 123 144 4
Renault 11477 53% 962 906 41.3 0.070 0.183 57 213 270 1/2
Saint Gobain 16272 20% 672 274 158.6 0.315 0.187 16 31 47 3
Sodexho 5885 5% 491 94 154.8 0.382 0.236 10 9 19 3
Stmicro-
eletronics
44112 -9% 684 547 94.5 0.205 0.211 75 68 143 2/3
Thomson-
CSF
5500 17% 319 254 32.2 0.100 0.305 19 78 97 1
Total Fina 95552 4% 1057 1166 120.8 0.179 0.143 106 421 527 3
Usinor 4536 6% 574 1375 14.1 0.036 0.257 7 49 56 1
Valeo 6341 -7% 455 229 77.7 0.193 0.239 19 19 38 2
Mean 26166 11% 706 461 157.7 0.304 0.194 34 130 164
Median 15022 6% 589 261 129.4 0.258 0.187 20 74 97
StDev 29361 18% 388 424 145.0 0.262 0.046 36 146 17931
Table 2: Descriptive Analysis of the News Impacts. The table shows the average sample values
of the trading activity and the order flow components around the public information releases
These statistics are cross-sectional averages calculated over intraday periods of 10 minutes. The
table reports the absolute values of the price change between the trade price at the beginning
and at the end of the time interval (“Abs DP”), the return volatility as the sum of squared price
changes over the time interval (“Volatility”), the average volume in number of shares traded
over the time interval (“Volume”), the order volume imbalance as the average absolute value of
the difference between the order volume pending at the best bid –and ask quotes (“Imbalance”),
the average time in seconds that elapses between successive transactions traded during the time
interval (“Trade Wait”), the quoted spread as the average difference between the best bid and
ask quotes (“Spread”), and the probability of trade continuation as the frequencies that two
successive trades have the same direction (“Cont.”). The last column (“Nbr of Obs “) on the
right side shows the total number of observations. Panel A shows the unconditional values, i.e.,
values over the entire sample period. Panel B shows the market reaction to public information
releases. Panel C shows the impact of news that is strictly firm specific. The panel does not
include the impact of index-related news. In Panels B and C, I analyze the market reaction over
six 10-minute time intervals, from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the news releases. I
calculate the student's t-test to test a significant difference between sample averages and the chi-
test to test a significant difference between sample volatilities. * (**) means a significance level
at 5% (1%).
Panel A: Unconditional Values
Abs DP Volatility Volume Imbalance Trade
Wait
Spread Cont. Nbr of
Obs
Mean 0.273 0.0024 565 787 44.17 0.194 0.619 2592565
Panel B: All News
Periods Abs DP Volatility Volume Imbalance Trade
Wait
PQS Cont.
-30/-20 0.283 0.0028 619 808 34.83 0.183 0.615 69965
-20/-10 0.290 0.0030 614 818 34.46 0.178 0.617 78772
-10/0 0.322* 0.0035* 589 885 33.22* 0.177* 0.614 89472
news/+10 0.323* 0.0037* 595 898* 31.87* 0.175* 0.614 99902
+10/20 0.309* 0.0032* 695* 838 34.67 0.181 0.610 85454
+20/+30 0.301* 0.0027 626* 859** 34.36** 0.180* 0.616 74282
Panel C: Firm Specific
Periods Abs DP Volatility Volume Imbalance Trade
Wait
Spread Cont.
-30/-20 0.275 0.0022 690 886 37.94 0.194 0.667 53243
-20/-10 0.282 0.0023 659 899 37.24 0.186 0.668 59137
-10/0 0.314* 0.0029* 617 949* 35.80* 0.182* 0.660 71711
news/+10 0.315* 0.0029* 633 961* 35.40* 0.182* 0.657 99888
+10/20 0.311* 0.0026 766** 948* 37.45* 0.188 0.647 67953
+20/+30 0.294* 0.0022 721* 977** 38.56* 0.189 0.662 6688432
Table 3: Price Changes in Ticks. The table shows the frequencies of the different sizes of price changes. I measure
the price change in ticks and rank it in nine categories: price falls equal to or less than four ticks, price decreases
by three ticks, price decreases by two ticks, price decreases by one tick, trades leaving prices unchanged, prices
increases by one tick, prices increases by two ticks, prices increases by three ticks, and price jumps equal or more
than four ticks. Panel A shows the price change around public information releases. Panel B shows the price
change around releases of only strictly firm-specific news, i.e., I do not examine index-related news. I analyze the
relative frequencies of price returns over six 10-minute time intervals, from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after
the news releases. The row titled ”Uncond” shows the relative frequencies of the unconditional price changes, i.e.,
over the entire sample period. The Paris Bourse has 4 tick size ranges. This table also shows the relative
frequencies of the price changes conditional on the four tick size ranges (“Cond. Tick 1”, “Cond. Tick 2”, “Cond.
Tick 3” and “Cond. Tick 4”). The last column (“Total”) shows the absolute frequencies.
Panel A: All News
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-30/-20 4.29% 2.46% 5.38% 12.01% 51.40% 12.34% 5.40% 2.50% 4.22% 69965
-20/-10 4.00% 2.39% 5.23% 12.52% 51.66% 12.61% 5.30% 2.33% 3.97% 78772
-10/0 4.07% 2.50% 5.39% 12.25% 51.15% 12.85% 5.33% 2.45% 4.01% 89472
news/+10 3.82% 2.52% 5.29% 12.37% 51.52% 12.71% 5.40% 2.44% 3.92% 99902
+10/20 3.92% 2.42% 5.41% 12.44% 51.38% 12.87% 5.32% 2.36% 3.89% 85454
+20/+30 3.92% 2.52% 5.22% 12.69% 51.07% 12.93% 5.25% 2.49% 3.90% 74282
N. Obs 19864 12293 26486 61638 255734 63359 26574 12085 19814 497847
Uncond. 5.65% 2.78% 5.27% 11.59% 49.34% 11.64% 5.25% 2.78% 5.70% 2592565
Cond. Tick 1 14.47% 2.50% 3.13% 5.43% 47.84% 6.19% 3.37% 2.73% 14.35% 49437
Cond. Tick 2 2.41% 2.22% 5.41% 12.69% 54.37% 12.95% 5.40% 2.12% 2.42% 182457
Cond. Tick 3 3.13% 2.65% 5.57% 13.56% 50.02% 13.81% 5.53% 2.58% 3.13% 252117
Cond. Tick 4 2.98% 2.39% 7.42% 11.63% 48.89% 13.24% 7.94% 2.58% 2.93% 13836
Panel B: Firm News
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-30/-20 4.25% 2.33% 5.36% 12.01% 51.70% 12.28% 5.50% 2.38% 4.20% 53243
-20/-10 4.03% 2.34% 5.12% 12.55% 51.69% 12.67% 5.24% 2.30% 4.06% 59137
-10/0 3.96% 2.44% 5.36% 12.34% 51.42% 12.90% 5.28% 2.42% 3.89% 71711
news /+10 3.80% 2.52% 5.29% 12.37% 51.53% 12.72% 5.41% 2.44% 3.92% 99888
+10/20 3.82% 2.44% 5.40% 12.48% 51.53% 12.88% 5.28% 2.32% 3.85% 67953
+20/+30 2.79% 2.50% 5.47% 13.47% 51.46% 13.64% 5.45% 2.44% 2.78% 66884
N. Obs 15746 10225 22332 52515 215867 53855 22449 10012 15815 418816
Uncond. 5.65% 2.78% 5.27% 11.59% 49.34% 11.64% 5.25% 2.78% 5.70% 2592565
Cond. Tick 1 14.30% 2.42% 3.24% 5.47% 47.94% 6.27% 3.36% 2.62% 14.38% 34272
Cond. Tick 2 2.36% 2.17% 5.41% 12.69% 54.59% 12.94% 5.40% 2.06% 2.37% 154081
Cond. Tick 3 3.12% 2.64% 5.50% 13.60% 50.11% 13.82% 5.50% 2.58% 3.14% 218216
Cond. Tick 4 3.24% 2.38% 7.33% 11.41% 48.87% 13.06% 8.02% 2.55% 3.14% 1224733
Table 4: Order Probit Regression for the Autoregressive (AR) Model. The table reports
descriptive statistics of the estimates of the ordered probit regression. The dependent variable of
the regression is the trade-by-trade price change in tick size. I divide the price change sizes in
nine categories: when the price falls (jumps) four ticks or less (more), when the price goes down
(up) three ticks, down (up) two ticks, down (up) one tick, and, finally, when the price is
unchanged. The explanatory variables are the trade indicator in t, t-1 and t-2. I denote the
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables as 1 β , 2 β and 3 β . The ordered probit
regression also provides the estimated values for the limit points n γ ,f o r 8 ,..., 1 n = , that divide
the nine categories of price change size. The sample statistics for the estimated coefficients are
the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and the standard deviation, and the mean, minimum,
and the maximum t-values.
Estimated Coefficients T-value
mean median min max sd mean min max
1 β 0.981 1.008 0.152 0.462 1.153 199.78 117.86 358.26
2 β -0.661 -0.672 0.105 -0.816 -0.333 -153.92 -296.32 -83.95
3 β -0.025 -0.023 0.013 -0.056 -0.001 -5.84 -10.19 -0.29
1 γ -2.289 -2.306 0.542 -3.424 -1.314 -240.27 -412.27 -147.44
2 γ -1.984 -1.980 0.449 -2.912 -1.173 -239.59 -440.95 -139.32
3 γ -1.586 -1.577 0.307 -2.233 -1.028 -222.92 -429.72 -126.60
4 γ -1.003 -0.957 0.154 -1.401 -0.777 -167.84 -332.03 -94.53
5 γ 0.925 0.944 0.107 0.696 1.153 157.70 97.77 273.94
6 γ 1.524 1.517 0.331 0.913 2.237 215.98 127.47 394.09
7 γ 1.921 1.918 0.475 1.055 2.888 234.61 139.36 413.21
8 γ 2.239 2.250 0.572 1.198 3.397 236.80 147.22 390.6034
Table 5: The Estimates of the Cost Components. The table shows the estimates of the cost components using the
Glosten-Harris model (“GH Model”), the Lin, Sanger, and Booth model (“LSB Model”) and the Autoregressive
model (“AR Model”). The table columns show estimates for adverse selection cost (ASC), order processing cost
(OPC), and order persistence (PERS). Panel A shows the average sample values of the estimated coefficients.
Panel B reports the average monetary value (in €) of the cost components calculated as the proportion of the
quoted spread. The row titled ”Uncond” shows the cost component estimates over the entire sample period. I also
estimate the cost components conditional on all the news releases (“All News”) and on only strictly firm-specific
news (“Firm”), i.e., I do not consider the index-related news. I analyze the cost components over six 10-minute
time intervals, from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the news releases.
Panel A: Estimated Cost Components
GH Model LSB Model AR Model
ASC OPC ASC OPC PERS ASC OPC PERS
Uncond. 0.003 0.113 0.271 0.480 0.249 0.415 0.566 0.245
Periods All News All News All News
-30/-20 0.312 0.102 0.186 0.520 0.229 0.263 0.379 0.318
-20/-10 0.183 0.097 0.191 0.519 0.218 0.258 0.392 0.268
-10/0 0.145 0.092 0.225 0.485 0.215 0.275 0.355 0.343
news /+10 0.145 0.103 0.212 0.543 0.245 0.273 0.414 0.266
+10/20 0.247 0.086 0.176 0.492 0.217 0.252 0.347 0.308
+20/+30 0.139 0.088 0.197 0.450 0.230 0.257 0.337 0.279
Periods Firm Firm Firm
-30/-20 0.240 0.103 0.212 0.498 0.264 0.304 0.359 0.348
-20/-10 0.161 0.100 0.199 0.539 0.232 0.283 0.395 0.299
-10/0 0.199 0.092 0.224 0.491 0.214 0.275 0.352 0.347
news /+10 0.145 0.103 0.211 0.529 0.261 0.270 0.416 0.267
+10/20 0.225 0.097 0.183 0.551 0.231 0.251 0.397 0.273
+20/+30 0.116 0.088 0.206 0.456 0.244 0.269 0.332 0.304
Panel B: Cost Components in €
GH Model LSB Model AR Model
ASC OPC ASC OPC PERS ASC OPC PERS
Uncond. 0.005 0.189 0.053 0.093 0.048 0.066 0.090 0.039
Periods All News All News All News
-30/-20 0.138 0.045 0.036 0.102 0.045 0.051 0.072 0.061
-20/-10 0.116 0.061 0.037 0.099 0.042 0.050 0.076 0.052
-10/0 0.109 0.069 0.043 0.093 0.041 0.050 0.065 0.063
news /+10 0.102 0.073 0.037 0.095 0.043 0.051 0.076 0.049
+10/20 0.134 0.047 0.036 0.101 0.044 0.050 0.069 0.061
+20/+30 0.110 0.070 0.041 0.092 0.047 0.053 0.070 0.058
Periods Firm Firm Firm
-30/-20 0.135 0.058 0.042 0.099 0.052 0.058 0.069 0.067
-20/-10 0.115 0.071 0.038 0.104 0.045 0.054 0.075 0.057
-10/0 0.125 0.058 0.044 0.096 0.042 0.052 0.066 0.065
news /+10 0.106 0.076 0.038 0.096 0.047 0.052 0.079 0.051
+10/20 0.132 0.057 0.036 0.108 0.045 0.051 0.081 0.056
+20/+30 0.107 0.082 0.043 0.095 0.051 0.056 0.069 0.06335
Table 6: Correlations Among Cost Components. The table shows the correlation coefficients
among cost components, liquidity proxies, and the number of news releases for the 30-stock
sample quoted at the Paris Bourse. I estimate the cost components by using the Glosten-Harris
model (GH), the Lin, Sanger, and Booth model (LSB) and the Autoregressive model (AR). The
table columns show estimates for adverse selection cost (ASC), order processing cost (OPC),
and order persistence (PERS). The liquidity proxies are market capitalization (Mkt Cap),
average daily number of trades (N. Trades), and the percentage quoted spread (PQS). The
number of news releases (N. News) is the total number of firm-specific news released by the
Reuters alert system.
ASC OPC PERS Liquidity






ASC GH 1.00 -0.27
LSB -0.08 1.00 0.02
AR 0.28 -0.44 1.00 -0.12
OPC GH 1.00 1.00 -0.25
LSB -0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.03
AR -0.20 0.60 1.00 -0.20 0.60 1.00 0.17
PERS LSB NA 1.00 0.22 0.04 -0.26 -0.01 1.00 -0.07
AR NA 0.02 0.33 -0.06 -0.20 -0.26 0.14 1.00 -0.20
Liquidity Mkt Cap -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 0.13 0.30 -0.07 0.30 1.00 0.70
N. Trades -0.25 0.02 -0.17 -0.25 0.13 0.40 -0.19 0.40 0.84 1.00 0.74
PQS -0.05 -0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.29 0.25 -0.29 -0.58 -0.64 1.00 -0.5436
Figure 1: Intraday News Patterns. The graph illustrates the rate of public news releases over 30-
minute time intervals. I calculate the rate of public news releases as the relative frequency of the
news released by the Reuters alert system. The graph shows three intraday patterns. The “all”
curve denotes all the firm-specific news arrivals. The “index” curve denotes the index-related
news, i.e., news referring to the CAC 40 index. The “firm” curve denotes the news that is
strictly firm-specific. The trading day at the Paris Bourse is 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. The graph also













































































































Figure 2: Intraday Liquidity Patterns. The graph illustrates the intraday patterns of two liquidity
proxies. The liquidity proxies are the average number of trades (Nbr of Trades) and the return
volatility (Volatility) over 30-minute time intervals. The volatility is 10,000 times the sample
average of the sum of all the squared price changes that occur over 30 minutes. The average
number of trades is the average sample of the average number of transactions exchanged over
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and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University  of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute of 
architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic and 
cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, and 
international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; arts; 
social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-sized 
institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage interdisciplinary 
work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of Lake Leman in the 
Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the landscape depicted in 
Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of the School of 
Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of Biochemistry is located 
in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of the 
League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation closely 
connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its international 
character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the approximately 650 
students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further emphasized by the use 
of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which draws upon the methods of  
economics, history, law, and political science  -reflects its aim to provide a broad approach and in-depth 
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